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The paper analyses from a statistical and comparative perspective the structural determinants of 
labour productivity (and income) and the dynamics of (non-monetary) trade competitiveness. The 
research focuses on developing countries, and more particularly on a comparison between two 
emblematic regions: Latin America, which was the best performer during the first phase of 
globalisation (XIX century up to the crisis of 1929) and Asia, which came to stand out since the 
1960s, first with Japan, then with the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIE), and now with the 
emergence of giants like China and India. 
After an introduction presenting the respective regional trends in labour productivity, the paper 
analyses these trends following a growth accounting protocol, applied to a selection of Asian and 
Latin American countries. The empirical model refers itself to a structuralist theoretical référent. The 
results obtained offer a disaggregated estimate of the respective structural sources of the changes in 
total labour productivity observed in both regions. The paper documents the divergences in structural 
transition paths, Asia showing complementarities in the development of its productive sectors, while 
in Latin America the transition towards a fully industrialised economy has been truncated, and a new 
dualism emerged. Because non-monetary (or "real") competitiveness is closely related with labour 
productivity, the comparative dynamic analysis provides interesting indicators on the evolution of 
comparative advantages. It provides also a new approach on the origins of the Latin American 
phenomenon of growing informality, a preoccupying source of income inequalities.  
In the third section, macroeconomic aspects are introduced in order to provide an explanation for 
the divergence in structural paths observed when comparing Asia with Latin America. The paper 
argues that the phenomenon of truncated industrialisation and substitutive informal services in Latin 
America may have some of its proximate roots in monetary and balance of payments considerations. 
After revising some policy options that could be derived from the analysis, a conclusion sums-up the 
main results. 
 
 1. Trade, productivity and income 
 
Trade liberalisation was meant to be a win-win strategy, where all participants were expected to 
gain from the increased economic exchanges. Indeed, there is little doubt that free trade is welfare 
enhancing in absolute term at global level. Thanks in particular to the high export-led growth 
experienced by those developing countries that were willing and able to seize their global 
opportunities, the world has recorded a considerable decrease in the number of people living in 
poverty. In Eastern Asia, the percentage of population below $1 purchasing power parity dropped 
from 33.0% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2004, weighting heavily in the total decline from 31.6% to 19.2%, 
respectively, observed for the total of developing countries (United Nations, 2007). The related 
figures for Latin America and the Caribbean are 10.3% for 1990, and 8.7% in 2004.  
                                                     
1 The views expressed in this document, which has not been submitted to formal editing, are those of 
the author and do not represent a position, official or unofficial, of the WTO Secretariat or WTO Members. 
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Yet, distributional considerations request to somewhat moderate this positive conclusion. In 
actual facts, the variance of the distribution of benefits between and within countries has been so large 
that income inequality has increased. As it became clear that there was a "winner group" among 
developing and transition economies, in terms of both income growth and market shares (v.g. the 
emerging Asian countries; Eastern and Central Europe). It became also tempting to define the not-so 
successful  as "losers", even if only in relative term compared to the more successful; and it was easy 
to blame increased trade openness for this outcome.  
Table 1 shows that growth patterns in labour productivity –a proxy for per capita income– 
differed considerably across regions, stagnating in the Middle East and growing more than 3% per 
year in Asia.  The higher growth is shared by most developing Asia, as evidenced by the low and 
decreasing coefficient of variation (even lower now, than the homogeneous group of Western 
European economies).   This group of countries is not only closing the productivity gap with the most 
advanced countries, but also show evidences of within-group income convergence. 
 
Table 1. Regional Productivity Growth 1990-2005 
 
 
Western 
Europe
Europe, 
others
Developed 
North America 
and Pacific Asia: NIEs
Asia: 
emerging and 
developing
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean
Middle 
East Africa
Average Annual Growth 1.62            1.79        1.57              3.13        3.06           1.08            0.09      0.62      
Coefficient of Variation:
  -1990-1992 0.16 0.43 0.19 1.21 0.24 0.53 0.46 0.90
  -2003-2005 0.15 0.49 0.22 1.16 0.12 0.58 0.40 0.92
Notes: All values in percent, based on GDP per Person Employed, in 1990 dollars. Regional growth rates are simple average 
of the respective country figures; coefficients of variation refer to within regional group variance.  
Sources: Author's calculation based on data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference 
Board, Total Economy Database, http://www.ggdc.net 
 
Yet, even within the "winner group" of Emerging Asia and Central European Countries, income 
distribution has been worsening, as shown by the evolution of Gini coefficients (table 2).  
This twin process of increasing "between and within" income group variance and its potentials 
implications for the future of the current wave of internationalization, have created a strong current of 
investigation. The relationship between international trade, economic growth and income distribution 
is a complex issue, which goes much beyond the focus of the present article. Winters et al. (2007) 
provides an extensive coverage of the related analytical literature.  
 
Table 2 Evolution of Gini coefficients, 1970-2000 
Years WORLD OECD LAC EAP SAS AFR
 ECE 
1970 0.6677 0.3516  0.5609  0.4437  0.3799  0.6487 
 0.2984 
1980 0.6814  0.3387  0.5556  0.4885  0.3837  0.6305 
 0.3009 
1990  0.6855  0.3532  0.5521  0.4854  0.3813  0.6506 
 0.3065 
2000  0.6842  0.3684  0.5712  0.5204  0.3338  0.6676 
 0.4280 
 
Notes: LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; EAP: East Asia; SAS: South Asia; AFR: Africa; ECE East and Central 
Europe. 
Sources: Dikhanov (2005)  
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From an international trade perspective, because non-monetary international competitiveness is 
closely related to comparative labour productivity, understanding the dynamics of productivity puts an 
interesting light on the evolution of comparative advantages in international trade. In this comparative 
framework, real competitiveness relates to labour productivity compared to a benchmark (usually 
given by the USA or other mature industrialized economy). But understanding the reasons of the 
apparently increasing gaps between the so-called "winners" and "losers" of globalisation is not an 
easy task.  
Globalisation unleashed a completely new set of business practices, and coincided with the 
Information Technology (IT) revolution. These two phenomena are intricately mixed; this makes the 
relationship between the dynamics of globalisation, comparative advantages, international trade and 
external imbalances a very complex issue which encompasses many technical, managerial and 
institutional issues. This fast evolving branch of economics is producing a series of new "new" trade 
theories to capture the complexity of the micro-macro relationships created by globalisation.  
As trade in semi-finished products and intra-firm transactions tends to dominate trade in some 
leading manufacture sectors such as electronics or automobiles, "trade in tasks" theory is increasingly 
eating into the more traditional analysis of comparative advantages. The argument of the new-
paradigm trade theory is that international competition takes place also at the level of individual tasks 
performed by internationally integrated firms. International competition is not only between firms 
producing substitutable goods, but also between workers performing similar tasks. Since some tasks 
can be off-shored more easily than others, the identification of winners and losers at workers level 
becomes more difficult. 
The existence and evolution of a trade-induced income gap is itself an empirical debate (Winters 
et al, 2007). Reviewing a large amount of evidence from several developing countries regarding their 
exposure to globalization and the parallel evolution of inequality, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006) find 
for example that the effect of globalization on inequality depends on many factors, several of which 
are country- and time-specific. 
 
Figure 1. Average Labour Productivity Gap with the USA: Asia and Latin America, 1970-2005. 
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Sources: Author's calculation based on data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference 
Board, Total Economy Database, January 2007, http://www.ggdc.net 
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Globalisation and IT may have shaken the old beliefs, rooted in the Solow model, that rich 
countries will be exporting capital to the developing world, allowing labour productivity to grow 
faster in these economies and close the income gap. Mirroring this prediction, the emerging Asian 
countries are registering a steady growth in their labour productivity, and receive an increasing share 
of foreign investment. Yet, after a period of slow growth, where its leadership over European 
economies was eroded, the US is also registering a boom in its labour productivity (the so-called 
"New Economy" factor). In the same time, the US economy is showing  a wide and persistent current 
account deficit, attracting the savings of the rest of the world.  
Despite the renewed dynamism of US productivity, the Asian economies are closing the labour-
productivity gap (figure 1). But closing the gap with the leading economies is not a monotonous 
process, from an historical perspective, as evidenced by the diverging trend experienced by Latin 
America. Because the productivity frontier is a moving target, each country's relative position may 
improve or deteriorate. Trade openness may probably play a strong positive role, as exemplified by 
the accelerating trend observed in China after joining the WTO. But opening the economies it is not a 
sufficient factor, and if Latin America could stop for a while the decreasing trend after the structural 
reforms of the 1990s, it could not reverse it.  
As figure 2 suggests, this is perhaps simply the reflect of convergence. At the end of the 1960s, 
Asian countries were poorer or least advanced in terms of value added per worker than Latin America, 
and may have registered a faster growth of productivity in a typical process of catching-up. But this is 
just a possibility and even if convergence is at work, it explains only part (34%) of the variance 
observed in the graph. Indeed, this convergence effects vanishes when the same simple regression is 
applied to a wider sample of developed and developing countries. Evidently, the dynamic of the 
productivity gap is the resultant of a process which is much more complex than the "simple" or 
"conditional" convergence that was predicted by Solow's model.  
Figure 2. Increase in Average Labour Productivity vs. Initial gap with the US in 1970  
Chin
H-K
India
Indo
Mal
Thai
Jap
Sin
Kor
Twn
Arg
Bol
Bra
Chil
Col
C-R
Mex
Per
Ven
R2 = 0.34
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
 
120
Notes: Horizontal axis: value added per worker index, 100=USA, at constant 1970 dollars; vertical axis: average annual 
growth rate of labour productivity, 1970-2005  
Sources: Author's calculation based on data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference 
Board, Total Economy Database. 
The rest of the paper will focus on analysing this dynamic from a structural perspective, looking 
for empirical elements that could provide some light on the reasons for the diverging patterns 
observed in Asia and in Latin America.  
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2. Sectoral Growth Accounting, Structural Changes and Productivity. 
 
The role of sectoral performance in economic growth has been a topic of major importance in 
growth studies, starting with "founding fathers" of the profession such as A. Smith or D. Ricardo. 
When it comes to modern development economics, the obvious conceptual reference is the model 
devised by Lewis (1954). 2  
Arthur Lewis model of a closed economy with unlimited supplies of labour analyses the mutation 
of an homogeneous traditional society, where subsistence activities predominate, into a modern 
"industrialised" economy. Labour is abundant, and its productivity is much higher in the modern 
sector. As long as the two sectors coexists, the dynamic of productivity cannot be captured by an 
aggregate production model "à la Solow" (Ros, 2000). During the labour surplus phase, the capital 
intensity of the whole economy rises, and with it the per capita income. But at the difference of the 
Solow model, this rise is predominantly due to the reallocation effect of labour from the subsistence 
economy to the capital intensive sector, and can occur even if there is no gain in "productivity 
proper". 
The conceptual framework used here is also closely related with the analytical works on labour 
policies in dualistic markets that derived from the well known Harris-Todaro (1970) model (see Fields 
2005 for a revision of recent developments). It should be noted that this class of models is concerned 
principally by labour market conditions and welfare distribution. This emphasis may lead to policy 
recommendations that differ with those derived from structuralist growth-oriented models "à la 
Lewis".3  
 
  a. The conceptual and statistical frameworks 
 
This section describes briefly the methodology used to isolate the contribution of sectoral effects 
to aggregate labour productivity. The presentation will follow as far as possible the growth accounting 
notation used by Van Ark and Timmer (2003), to facilitate cross-references with the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, which provides a world wide data base and research papers on 
productivity.  
Because of the lack of systematic and detailed information on sectoral capital stock in developing 
economies, the analysis will focus on labour productivity. It should be noted, nevertheless, that 
leaving out the investment side does not incur in a large loss of relevant information for our present 
purpose. Indeed, previous studies indicate that the effect of capital reallocation is very reduced 
(Poirson, 2000). This tends to confirm the intuitive perception that capital markets (with the notable 
exception of agricultural land, but it is not an flexible asset) are less segmented than labour markets in 
developing countries. 
The intuition behind the method is simple: when sectors of very different labour productivity 
coexist in a single economy, total factor productivity shall improve when labour migrates to the 
higher productive sectors, even in the absence of additional technical progress. This structuralist 
approach differs from the neo-classic "Solow" models that assume that sectors are not differentiated 
and can be represented by a single production function. 
                                                     
2 See Syrquin (1988) for an overview of the role of structural changes in development economics, and 
Ranis (2003) for an update on the theoretical debate. 
3 In particular, rural development is the first-best policy in the context of the Harris-Todaro models, 
because an emphasis on modern-sector urban employment may create more income inequality and 
underemployment. Some income restraints in the urban sector are also considered as a welfare enhancing 
option. The "structuralist" school of development, at the contrary, privileged higher growth rates based on fast 
(and subsidised) industrialization.  
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Starting from a Lewis model with two sectors, one "traditional" and one "modern" economy, and 
using standard growth accounting relations, the aggregate labour productivity can be decomposed as 
follows: 
 
Y= Y1+Y2           [1] 
where 
Y = total GDP 
Yi = Value added in sector i=1,2 
 
L being the total labour force employed in the economy, we can write, using the same 
convention:  
L= L1+L2          [2] 
 
A any point of time t=T : 
PT = YT/LT = [Y 1T/L 1T . L 1T/LT ] + [Y 2T/L 2T . L 2T/LT]     [3] 
which can be simplified as : 
PT = P 1T  S 1T   + P 2T  S 2T          [4] 
with: 
P iT : Value added per employed worker in sector i=1,2 at t=T  
S iT : Share of labour force employed in sector i (i=1,2) at t=T. 
 
At the initial stage described by Lewis (1954), most labour force is (under)employed in the 
traditional sector, leading to very low per capita income in this sector, at, or close to, subsistence 
level. Added value per worker in the modern sector is much higher than the subsistence income.  
 
S 1T  >> S 2T          [5] 
and  
P 2T  >> P 1T          [6] 
 
When a developing economy transits to higher level of industrialization and income, labour 
moves from sector 1 to sector 2. The large structural differences in labour productivity indicated in [6] 
implies that the aggregate labour productivity may raise thanks to sectoral reallocation effects, even if 
there is no technical progress.  
The two-sectors framework can be used also to model the evolution of the Gini income 
concentration coefficient (Escaith, 2006). As transition occurs, the Gini describes an inverted U curve 
"à la Kuznets", being maximum when L1 = L2 = ½ for any given level of income differential between 
sector 1 and 2.4  
For growth accounting purposes, the two sector model can be easily generalised to n sectors. In a 
multisectoral context, changes in labour productivity between two disconnected period of time (t = 0 ; 
T) can be decomposed as follows: 
 
                                                     
4 This result holds even when discarding the Solow hypothesis of factor remuneration at the marginal 
productivity, as long as wages are in relation with sectoral added value (for example using a conceptual référent 
based on reservation or efficiency wages). The received theory of urban-rural migration, based on the Harris-
Todaro model, is also based on the assumption that formal urban wages are set above marginal-
productivity/market-clearing levels. 
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(PT – P0)  = [(P∑
=
n
i 1
i
T – Pi0 ). (Si0 + SiT)/2] + ∑ [(S
=
n
i 1
i
T – Si0 ). (Pi0 + PiT)/2]  [7] 
 
It should be noted that, because the analysis applies to discrete changes (and not to marginal 
continuous ones), various weighting sets of parameters can be used, and decomposition is not unique. 
For practical and statistical reasons,5 we decided to use the arithmetic average of start and end points 
[(Si0 + SiT)/2 and (Pi0 + PiT)/2] to weight the changes (PiT – Pi0 ) and (SiT – Si0 ). 
From a statistical and growth accounting perspective, Maddison (1952) attributes to S. Fabricant 
the paternity of the fundamental formula used to separate the rise in productivity into two 
components: the change in productivity in each sector of the economy, which he calls the rise in 
"productivity proper" and the changes in the productive structure. The first sum on the right side of 
[7] represents changes in "productivity proper" observed for the n sectors. The second sum indicates 
the reallocation effect of labour between sectors (when labour shifts from a low-productivity to a high 
productivity sector, the net effect is positive on aggregate labour productivity).   
We can expect the first element to be positive, as developing countries incorporate more and 
more technical progress in their production process. The second term should also be positive as long 
as the labour markets are segmented and the economy transits from a traditional to an industrialized 
state. In this case, one should expect workers to shifts to more productive employment opportunities. 
This is, for example, one of the force behind the rapid urbanization observed in developing 
economies.  The difference in labour productivity and expected wages, which explains the 
urbanization process, is also the key factor behind the Harris-Todaro models. 
When the economy reaches its steady state, labour markets are more homogeneous and structural 
shifts should not be as important compared with the transition phase. In this case, marginal sectoral 
productivity tends to be the same across sectors, and the economy starts behaving according to the 
Solow aggregated model. 
From a statistical standpoint, the decomposition formula [8] can be used on national account data 
which are generally available at constant process for most countries in the world, provided that the 
corresponding disaggregation exists for labour force employed. The latter is, unfortunately, quite a 
restricting factor. For many developing countries, comprehensive labour force estimates by sectors of 
activity are available only for census years, because regular household surveys have an incomplete 
geographical coverage.  
 
  b. Comparing Asia and Latin America. 
 
• Sources and coverage 
Two different sources were used for the purpose of comparing the dynamic of productivity and its 
sources, sectoral recomposition or "productivity proper": 
 - For Asia, we use the results of Van Ark y Timmer (2003), from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. They were computed using a very similar formula for nine Asian economies, at 
different stages of industrialization (Korea, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand y Taiwan.) The authors find that the traditional source of reallocating resources from 
agriculture to industry is still quite powerful for South Asian and South East Asian developing 
countries. The structural factor has not yet disappeared in the most advanced East Asian countries. 
These finding can be completed and reinforced with the results of a recent IMF publication, which 
uses similar decomposition approach and include more Asian countries, albeit at a more aggregated 
sectoral level. The results show that sectoral shifts have been particularly important in explaining the 
                                                     
5 On practical aspects, using an average value avoids making arbitrary assumptions on the choice of 
weighting parameters and bridges the gap with alternative dynamic shift-share models; more formally, is allows 
for symmetry in the decomposition formula. 
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catching-up process. Within Asia, and especially in China, labour moved out of agriculture at a faster 
rate. Another reason explaining the strength of the sectoral reallocation effect is that the initial 
intersectoral productivity differentials were higher in Asia than in other developing regions (IMF, 
2006). 
 - For Latin America, we use the results of Escaith (2006). The decomposition [8] was used 
on a set of nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The main findings of the reference paper are that inter-sectoral 
reallocation of resources was also relevant in explaining total labour productivity. But the labour shift 
was not predominantly from agriculture to industry, but from agriculture to services. Indeed, while 
industry was able to increase its "productivity proper", it was not creating enough job for the 
expanding urban population. As a result, the share on labour in manufacture decreased. This 
phenomenon was perceptible since the 1970s. Because the jobs created in services were of 
diminishing productivity, the end result was a slower increase in total value added per worker. Once 
again, these results can be compared with the findings of the IMF (2006), with Latin America 
registering lower share of manufacturing employment and lower share of manufacturing value-added 
than Asia. Indeed, according to this publication, "unlike Asia, Latin America experienced a decline 
over time in manufacturing productivity related to the United States", while "by contrast [with Asia] 
sectoral shifts were too weak to help promote convergence toward the United State".  
 
Albeit using different approaches in the normalization of national account data and adopting 
slightly different version of the Fabricant Formula, the methodological approaches used in these two 
sources remain sufficiently similar to allow for a direct comparison of the respective dynamics of 
labour productivity.6 The period covered corresponds to the 1985-2001 period, corresponding to the 
years for which most data were available in Van Ark and Timmer (2003). 7  
As always in descriptive statistics, the choice of the sample, in this case start and end years, may 
influence the results. The period 1985-2001 corresponds for Latin America to the depth of two 
economic recessions, the first one being harder than the second. In that sense, it makes sense to 
compare them as they correspond to the same recessive phase of two successive economic cycles. As 
far as Asia is concerned, 2001 was a year of stagnation in many countries, after the 1997-1998 crisis. 
This may perhaps introduce a negative bias in the Asian indicators (especially for the financial 
sectors).  
 
 
• Comparative sectoral analysis  
Tables 3.a and 3.b show the results obtained from the two references studies, using the nine 
sectors of national accounts. The first fact that literally jump to the eyes is that very few numbers from 
table 3.a (Asia) are negative, while they represent more than 40% on the numbers appearing on the 
Latin American sheet. As a matter of facts, average annual productivity growth (a close indicator of 
real wages income) has been negative in Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, while it almost 
stagnated in all other Latin American economies, with the exception of Chile. 
Indeed, with a 3.6% average annual increase in labour productivity, Chile is the only Latin 
economy that approximates the Asian pattern of productivity growth.  If we exclude Japan, a mature 
industrialized country whose productivity per worker grew  at close to 2% yearly, the results for the 
Asian developing and New Industrialized Economies (NIE) range from 2.6% (Indonesia) to 4.8% 
(Taiwan). 
 
                                                     
6 This holds reasonably well because comparisons are restricted here to first differences and do not 
intend to parallel absolute magnitudes in value-added by worker, which would require normalizing a series of 
parameters, such as exchange rates and the base year to be used in deflating prices. 
7 Escaith(2006) covers the period 1960-2003. 
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Table 3.a  Sectoral decomposition of aggregate labour productivity as percentage of aggregate 
growth, Asia 1985-2001 (in percentage) 
Asia
Hong Kong India Indonesia
Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) 3.6 1.8 1.8 4.0 4.1 -0.1 2.6 0.4 2.3
Sectoral Contribution: 100 50 50 100 102 -2 100 13 87
Agriculture -1 -1 0 4 11 -7 -29 4 -33
Mining 0 0 0 3 2 0 15 -5
Manufacturing 32 32 0 21 21 0 57 18 39
Public Utilities 12 10 1 4 3 0 8 4
Construction 1 0 0 8 7 1 5 -6
Wholesale and Retail Trade 19 13 6 17 15 1 17 7 11
Transport and Communications 12 9 3 12 12 0 6 0 6
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 7 -29 36 13 11 2 7 -19 26
Community, Social and Personal Services 19 15 4 19 19 0 14 10 3
Ja
20
4
11
pan Malaysia Singapore
Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) 1.9 1.7 0.2 4.5 3.8 0.7 3.8 3.3 0.4
Sectoral Contribution: 100 88 12 100 85 15 100 88 12
Agriculture 0 0 0 -1 2 -4 -1 0
Mining 0 0 0 15 9 6 0 0
Manufacturing 44 43 1 27 18 9 44 43 1
Public Utilities 4 3 1 5 3 2 4 3
Construction 2 0 2 -4 -1 -3 7 7 0
Wholesale and Retail Trade 9 10 -1 7 11 -4 18 19 -1
Transport and Communications 7 6 1 8 5 2 16 15
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 22 19 4 18 10 8 13 -5 18
Community, Social and Personal Services 7 3 4 9 10 -1 -2 6
Korea Taiwan Thailand
Total Pro
0
0
1
2
-9
per Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) 4.6 4.0 0.6 4.8 4.1 0.7 4.2 1.3 2.8
Sectoral Contribution: 100 87 13 100 86 14 100 32 68
Agriculture 1 4 -2 1 1 0 1 8
Mining 2 2 0 1 1 0 8 6
Manufacturing 60 57 3 35 33 2 47 22 26
Public Utilities 6 5 1 4 4 0 14 9 5
Construction 7 3 3 0 1 -2 -3 -12 8
Wholesale and Retail Trade 4 8 -4 17 16 1 5 -11 16
Transport and Communications 10 9 1 11 10 0 17 11 6
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 12 3 9 14 3 11 0 -5 5
Community, Social and Personal Services -3 -3 0 7 8 -1 8 2 6
-7
2
 
 
 
(to be continued .../...) 
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Table 3.b Sectoral decomposition of aggregate labour productivity as percentage of aggregate 
growth, Latin America 1985-2001  
Latin America
Argentina Bolivia Brazil
Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) 0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Sectoral Contribution: 100 75 25 -100 -303 203 100 21 79
Agriculture 6 16 -10 -15 32 -48 23 106 -83
Mining 11 16 -6 -14 110 -124 17 5 12
Manufacturing -12 74 -86 -10 -83 73 -22 -115 93
Public Utilities 11 16 -5 9 21 -12 21 13 9
Construction -6 8 -14 -7 -62 55 -14 -47 33
Wholesale and Retail Trade -5 -12 6 -17 -174 157 1 -15 16
Transport and Communications 32 14 19 33 45 -12 57 36 21
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 47 -33 79 39 -196 235 -47 42 -89
Community, Social and Personal Services 17 -24 41 -118 4 -122 65 -2 67
Chile Colombia Costa Rica
Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) 3.6 2.5 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.8 0 1
Sectoral Contribution: 100 70 30 100 80 20 100 -35 135
Agriculture 7 13 -5 -7 51 -58 1 39 -
Mining 9 21 -12 44 33 12 -1 0 -1
Manufacturing 16 22 -6 -19 -11 -8 43 36 7
Public Utilities 4 5 -1 2 -1 4 9 2
Construction 10 5 5 -33 -35 2 -9 -11 3
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14 6 8 -19 -70 51 27 -74 100
Transport and Communications 13 10 3 6 -3 10 39 9 30
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 23 -28 51 26 55 -29 19 -62 81
Community, Social and Personal Services 5 18 -13 99 61 38 -28 25 -53
Mexico Peru Venezuela
Total Proper
38
7
Shifts Total Proper Shifts Total Proper Shifts
Annual Productivity Growth (1985-2001) -0.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.5 -1.0 1 0
Sectoral Contribution: -100 -215 115 -100 -189 89 -100 -139 39
Agriculture -17 8 -25 18 37 -19 -3 7 -10
Mining -5 8 -13 -4 40 -43 15 -2 16
Manufacturing 13 -2 15 -17 3 -20 -27 -25 -1
Public Utilities 2 3 0 9 11 -2 1 3 -2
Construction -15 -36 21 14 28 -13 -18 -28 10
Wholesale and Retail Trade -30 -135 105 -25 -113 88 -28 -27 0
Transport and Communications 23 13 11 0 -20 20 -5 -12 7
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 10 -30 40 9 -74 83 -21 -35 14
Community, Social and Personal Services -83 -45 -39 -105 -99 -5 -15 -20 5
 
Notes: Values in percent of total labour productivity variation. Annual growth is linear (simple arithmetic average) and not a 
compound rate. 
Sources: Author's calculations based on Van Ark and Timmer (2003) and Escaith (2006).  
 
From a comparative perspective, two major aspects merit attention: 
 
 - First, the structural role of the industrial sector in "explaining" productivity growth in Asia, 
based on advances in both "productivity proper" and "labour shifts". In Latin America, it proved 
almost impossible for the manufacturing sector to advance simultaneously in both productivity and 
labour share, Costa Rica being the exception. In general the two components of productivity growth 
evidenced opposite signs, and were sometime negative in both dimensions (Colombia and 
Venezuela).8
 - Second, the service sectors in Asia did not experience an outstanding growth in 
employment, relative to other sectors. Parallel to job creation in services, added value per employee 
increased, with a few exceptions (finance in Honk Kong and Indonesia being the most notable, and 
                                                     
8 Contrary to the standard Cobb-Douglas function, labour inputs can increase together with labour 
productivity as a result of intra-sector shifts from low-productivity firms to higher ones, scale effects due to 
increased market shares, or a combination of both. 
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related probably to the 1997-1998 financial crisis). In addition, shifts out of the agricultural sectors 
were moderate. Thus, Asian countries remain basically good-producing economies, with an 
continuing shift towards industrialization. On the contrary, in many Latin American countries, the 
service sectors absorbed an increasing share of the working force.  
It would be wrong to pretend that this occurs because Latin American countries represent a more 
advanced subset of economies, that are transiting towards a post-industrialised "service oriented" 
society. In Latin America, the jobs offered by the service sectors were generally of low and 
decreasing productivity. This denotes a dysfunctional situation where the highly productive sectors 
are not able to create new jobs, and new entrants in the labour market have to settle for low-quality 
jobs. These shortcomings were identified as the sources of the increasing wage gaps observed in the 
1990s, and the reappearance of a large informal sector in this region (Escaith, 2006)  
From a view point of systemic competitiveness and international trade, it would also be erroneous 
to reduce the debate between two models, the outwards-oriented one stressing tradable goods in Asia 
and the inwards-oriented post-industrialized Latin American case, with most jobs created in services. 
As in the business management distinction between back office and front office functions in a firm, 
both being necessary to the firm competitiveness and efficiency, many services are complementary to 
the production functions. As investment in infrastructure (roads, electricity network) is 
complementary to production, the same can be said of telecommunication services and other similar 
activities. The systemic competitiveness of the economy depends not only on its exporting industry, 
but also on the quality of the "infrastructure" services provided to these industries. 
 
• Tradable, infrastructure and other services. 
Taking into consideration the above mentioned arguments, the initial nine National Account 
sectors were aggregated into three categories: tradable goods production, "infrastructure" services, 
and the rest of sectors (representing basically public and private services to households). 
Table 4 shows a summary of the two regions, with a sectoral aggregation between Good 
production (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture); Infrastructure services (Public Utilities, Construction 
and Transport and Communication) and the other non specified services. The classification is 
arbitrary, as it is usual. For example, economic theory indicates that financial services are key to 
enhance firms' productivity, especially by screening out investment projects. On the other hand, most 
jobs created in banking were to serve households, which justified its classification in the third 
category. 
 
The summary table 4 reveals the contrast between the two regions. True to their respective 
cultural background, Asia is showing more harmony and equilibrium while Latin America stands for 
the contrasts and oppositions. But the consequences of these contrasting results for Latin America are 
preoccupying in terms of international competitiveness and population welfare. Once again, the poor 
quality of the Latin American jobs created in other services is appalling. In Asia, these services are 
also gaining importance in the labour market, but are doing so in line with the development of the rest 
of the economies, and the job created are of good quality (productivity proper raises in these sectors, 
in line with labour participation).  
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Table 4. Accumulated Changes in Labour Productivity, 1985-2001: Comparative Aggregated Table 
 
 
Asia Total Proper Shifts
  - Goods 5,077 4,310 767
  - Infrastructure Services 2,402 1,635 767
  - Other Services n.e.s 3,981 1,965 2,016
Total (USD) 11,410 7,911 3,550
Annual Labour Productivity Growth (%) 3.78
Latin America Total Proper Shifts
  - Goods 706 6,105 -5,399
  - Infrastructure Services 2,634 -227 2,860
  - Other Services n.e.s -1,951 -14,701 12,750
Total (USD) 1,389 -8,823 10,212
Annual Labour Productivity Growth (%) 0.43
Sources: Based on Table 3. 
Notes: Accumulated variation refer to average across country, in 1990 USD. The respective contributions for each sectoral 
aggregate were obtained by simple average across sectors and countries. 
 
Information gathered from secondary data sources seems to validates the contrasting sectoral 
results obtained between Asia and Latin America. For example, IMF(2006) indicates that "the 
movement of labor into the services sector was at least as large as that toward industry. Also [except 
in Japan and the NIEs] in most of Asia the share of industry in total employment is still growing.  
Unlike Asia, Latin America experienced a decline over time in manufacturing productivity relative to 
the United States...". 
Thus, it seems safe to conclude this empirical section on sectoral decomposition of productivity 
growth by stating that productivity increase in Asia is based on a virtuous structural transformation, 
which in turn sets the grounds for a sustainable projection of the present trend. Obviously, one should 
expect the contribution of structural changes to total labour productivity to diminish with the 
reduction of surplus labour from agriculture, but for the time being the transition is functioning. It 
means, as a corollary, that Asia should keep on reducing its productivity gap and increase its non-
monetary competitiveness on the international markets. Latin America, on the contrary, seems 
engaged in a perverse transition from one dualist model, where subsistence sector is located in the 
tradition rural area, to a new dualist society, with a growing urban informal sector similar to the 
"murky sector" analysed in Fields (1975) and larger income gaps. 
Returning to our conceptual "référent", the sectoral data presented in this section tends also to 
show that Asia is going through the transition from traditional to modern as expected from the Lewis 
model, while the Latin American case indicate a trounced transition. The external sector mimics the 
internal situation: because differences in domestic sectoral productivity (and wages) remain large, 
Latin America finds difficult to close the systemic productivity gap with industrialised economies, 
and loses external competitiveness vis-à-vis Asia. 
 
3. Globalisation and the macroeconomic restrictions to full structural transition.  
 
This part reinserts nominal and financial aspects into "real" structural analysis, to examines how a 
broad fall in trading and financial transaction costs may have affected the key determinants of 
structural adjustment, positively, in the case of Asia, and negatively in Latin America. The initial 
Lewis model was of a closed economy, and the speed of the transition from traditional to modern was 
 13
constraint by internal investment and savings capacities. The liberalization of international goods and 
financial markets was supposed to reduce these internal restrictions by opening new export markets 
for the national products and facilitating capital accumulation in the modern sector by attracting 
external savings.  
The statistical evidence shows that globalisation was effective in opening both real and financial 
markets. The development of international financial markets has been far more dynamic than that of 
trade in goods and services. Nevertheless, international trade has been increasing much more rapidly 
than global GDP, and one of the most important feature behind this process has been the growing 
importance of emerging market economies in world trade.  Our results show that Asia was able to 
thrive on this trend to foster domestic production and productivity, while Latin America failed.  
One plausible interpretation is that, in Asia, the creation of new jobs in the service sectors 
responded to a growing effective demand for this type of activity. As this supply responded to an 
actual demand (e.g., from an expanding industrial sector in need of business services, or from 
households with the raise of a middle class), additional value added was created in this process. This 
means that sectoral and average labour productivity kept on increasing, and the higher salaries paid to 
the service sector helped in turn sustaining the demand.  
At the contrary, the Latin American data indicates a situation where industry faced difficulties to 
increase its sales on the international market, and was forced instead into a process of productivity 
enhancing investment to defend its market shares. 9  As a consequence, the modern manufacturing 
sector has not been able to absorb the surplus labour force originating from the traditional sector, or 
resulting from the natural increase in the active population. In absence of social protection for the 
unemployed, working in the (informal) service sector remained the only feasible strategy for job 
seekers. As job creation in these sectors did not respond to an increase in demand for their services, 
value-added per worker decreased.  
The truncated transition in Latin America is therefore most probably attributable to demand 
constraints. These restrictions from the demand side impede the expected transition to a competitive 
industrial economy (once again, competitiveness here is systemic: persistent dualism implies that, 
even if it is possible to find islands of competitiveness in Latin America, these islands do not play 
their expected role of development poles).10
Effective demand, when one refers to developing countries, is chiefly limited to external demand. 
This reductionism is explained usually by the shallowness on internal market and, more importantly, 
its limited multiplier effect due to the necessity of importing capital and high technology goods. This 
tradition of analysis starts with the Harrod-Domar's warranted rate of growth in a closed economy 
model, and extends it to the case of open developing economies as in the well known "two-gaps" 
models. Foreign capital can raise their growth rate by temporarily lifting their saving constraints, and 
providing the foreign exchange to pay from necessary imports. But in the long run debt should be 
repaid, and developing countries need to export in order to grow. A strategy focused on internal 
demand would quickly face balance of payment constraints, as it happened in Latin America with the 
external debt crisis of 1982.  
The structural reforms implemented during the 1980s intended to reshape the productive sector 
along an export-led model of development, inspired by the "Asian Miracle". By opening their 
economies, the reformers expected to correct the allocation efficiency gap of previous inward-oriented 
                                                     
9 Escaith (2006) shows that "productivity proper" increased dramatically in Latin America in the early 
1990s, returning to the growth rate registered during the "golden years" of the 1960s. But at the same time, the 
industry reduced its participation in the labour force. This suggests that reforms in LA were successful at 
microeconomic level, but were less so from a macro perspective. This pattern differs from what is been 
observed in Asia , were investment in manufacturing increase both productivity and capacity, resulting in higher 
employment.  
10 It is tempting to blame the "maquiladora" mode of industrialisation for this outcome. But the Asian 
example shows that processing manufactured goods for exports can be used by emerging economies to rapidly 
close the productivity gap and build an industrial base out of the production of labour-intensive parts. Indeed, 
from the dual perspectives of development macroeconomics (binding external constraints) and new "trade-in 
tasks" paradigm, "maquiladoras" should be considered part of the solution.  
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policies, and to foster the development of labour intensive and internationally competitive 
manufactures. As a matter of fact, the reverse was observed. Most of the investment that took place in 
these sectors was to increase efficiency and gain competitiveness in the face of external competitors. 
It led to an increase in the capital/output ratio, but not to an increase in total capacity nor in the use of 
more labour. At the contrary, employment in these sectors reduced its share of the total labour force, 
as is exemplified by the negative signs affecting labour-shifts.  
This may not be surprising, if one remembers that most analysis of the success behind the Asian 
Newly Industrialized Economies in the 1970s stressed that the demand-side factors were as likely –or 
more– to explain the success of export-led strategies, than supply-side considerations. By adopting an 
export-led orientation, these countries did not immediately benefit from greater growth in technical 
efficiency (the Maddison's "productivity proper"); but the expanding demand linked to export 
orientations did help them to maintain productivity levels in the face of a rapid increase in production 
(Pack, 1988). Viewed from this perspective, the advantage of the first phase of export orientation was 
more quantitative than qualitative: labour could be moved rapidly from low productivity sectors to 
high productivity activities without confronting diminishing returns.  
This implied that real competitiveness (the capacity to efficiently produce what was demanded by 
the international markets) had to be supported during all the transition process by a competitive 
exchange rate (nominal competitiveness). The difficulties faced by Latin America to seize the 
opportunities offered by international trade may be related to a lack of competitiveness, itself related 
to a misalignment of the effective exchange rates during the transition period.  
This relative overvaluation is symptomatic of the so called "resource curse": from an international 
perspective, Latin America is comparatively rich in natural resources, which attract investments and 
appreciate the real exchange rate. By the time of trade liberalization, on the other hand, Asian 
developing countries with large pools of unskilled labour force and lower wages, such as China and 
India, were already emerging in the world trade scene, rapidly gaining market shares in the OECD 
countries.  
These effects put a cap to the development of internationally competitive labour-intensive 
industries in Latin America and forced a pattern of specialization based on higher-skilled labour 
(Perry and Olarreaga, 2006). 11 But this niche of specialization is capital intensive, and was already 
occupied by the NIEs such as Korea or Taiwan. Therefore, this strategy could not generate enough 
jobs to absorb the new entrants in the urban labour market, and lower wages in the industrial sector 
would not solve the excess labour supply. At the contrary, salaries for higher-skill workers and 
professional increased as firms were competing to attract the needed technicians. Infrastructure 
services (with the exception of construction) were also investing much more in new technologies 
during the 1990s and relying more on capital intensive processes.  
At the difference of East Asia, were manufacturing firms have been able to create enough low-
qualification jobs to absorb the rural migrants and the new entrants into active population, in Latin 
America, the oversupply of labour had to be absorbed by the non-infrastructure service sector. As the 
domestic market for such services was not expanding accordingly, labour absorption was 
accompanied by a decrease in value-added per worker (and real salary) in the formal sector, and –
increasingly– by the rise of the urban informal sector. The share of informal sector in total urban 
employment increased from 43% in 1990 to 47% in 2003, in a context of increased intersectoral 
income differential (Weller, 2005). 
It would be erroneous to conclude that East Asia also was able to avoid this increase in income 
differentials. Table 2 indicates that the Gini coefficient raised significantly in this region between 
1990 and 2000. As we previously pointed out, this outcome is coherent with the Lewis' model 
prediction; in the case of Asia, it reflects the rise of an urban middle class as workers move-up the 
income distribution ladder by reallocating from traditional to industrial sectors. But the rise of this 
                                                     
11 [TN ‡: There are indications that this strategy proved effective at micro-economic level. According to 
Bender and Li (2002), Latin American revealed competitive advantages in manufacture improved in the 1990s. 
But this qualitative improvement had limited macroeconomic effects due to Latin America's low initial share in 
world manufacture exports.] 
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middle class creates new market demands and new jobs in services, that fuel the virtuous Lewis circle 
and create the condition for a more internal-demand driven economy. 
 
4. Prospects and policy options 
 
The prospects for Latin American income distribution are not bright, if the recent simulation from 
World Bank are to be believed. According to its simulations, the share of Latin American in the 
bottom decile of global income distribution could rise by 50% in 2030 (World Bank, 2007).  
Albeit "comparaison n'est pas raison", the Asian example could serve as a guide for future 
policy. Macroeconomic policy has been carefully managed in most Asian country to complement 
export-led policies, but such a strategy is not easily put into practice. 12First, nominal wage increases 
have to be kept under control in order to maintain the overall favourable competitive position and 
control the income gap between rural and urban population.  
Writing on China economic policy challenges, Flasbeck (2005) recommends that, if it is not 
possible to keep wage increases inline with productivity, a crawling peg with constant devaluation 
might be the second best solution. But one should be reminded that real exchange rate, which 
determines nominal competitiveness, is not a flexible policy variable, even with the capital controls 
recommended by this author. The experience of Thailand when such controls were implemented to 
curb currency appreciation are an example. More importantly, competitive devaluations undertaken at 
global level are at best a zero-sum games, and are not sustainable. 
On the other hand, prudent macroeconomic management may be able to prevent the non-
structural appreciation of real exchange rate that accompany the over-heating phases of the economy. 
Some sort of short-term capital controls may be one option to reduce volatility in the capital account 
of the balance of payment, and structural targets for fiscal policy are certainly helpful for reducing the 
volatility of internal demand. 
Nevertheless, prudent macroeconomic policies might not be enough to help Latin American 
countries breaking the vicious circle that led to the new dualism. Our analysis suggests that 
productivity performances reflect in good part the capacity to reallocate existing resources. In 
particular, the findings underline the importance of : 
(i) Fostering sectoral and geographical labour mobility, not only in the restricted sense of labour 
market flexibility, but also by helping workers to move to better paid or more promising jobs (putting 
emphasis on technical education and training, a portable pension scheme and pro-active regional 
planning to up-grade public services outside capital cities);  
(ii) Helping small firms (representing the majority of jobs, especially in the regions) to gain 
directly or indirectly access to the global market. Helwitt and Gillson (2003) review a series of 
measures that trade facilitation programmes could undertake in order to increase employment, 
especially from the small and medium firms.  
(iii) Seizing the opportunity offered by off-shoring and out-sourcing from industrial countries, to 
generate a critical mass of manufacturing jobs, especially within the low-to-middle qualification 
brackets, where the deficit is higher. The Asian example shows that export processing is part of the 
solution, fostering "learning by doing". 13 These activities are also usually located outside the capital 
city, reducing the regional asymmetries in job opportunities.  
                                                     
12 [NT ‡: some of  the Asia-Latin America industrial symmetries have been developing also in the euro 
area,  Germany engaged in the late 1990s in a reshaping of her industrial sector, boosting competitiveness 
through a mix of off-shoring and cost-control policies, and was able to consolidate her position as first world 
exporter (a position challenged by China) despite the euro's appreciation, while southern European countries 
(France, Greece, Italy and Spain) came to increasingly rely on labour intensive internal services and 
construction. By loosing systemic competitiveness and eroding both their fiscal and external balances, they 
became highly vulnerable to the housing bubble and a potential down-grade of their public debt.] 
13 In Latin America, at the contrary, it is not unusual to see these activities, dubbed as "maquiladoras" 
as part of the problem (see footnote 10). In line with the industrialisation by import substitution (ISI) tradition, 
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(iv) Finally, the Latin American region may also accept the truncated industrialization as a fact, 
and look into its large services sector as a potential for exports. Traditionally considered as non-
tradable by development economists, trade in services has increased significantly thanks to the 
advance in IT technology and the new business models –including trade in tasks– that emerged with 
globalisation. Some Latin American firms have been able to benefit from this trend (ECLAC, 2007). 
Here too, public policies should not focus only on high or specialised skills (e.g. specialised medical 
treatment, IT, finance), but include also activities such as health and personal care or tourism, that 
offer a higher potential for creating jobs in the low to medium qualification brackets.    
The policy implications of the Harrod-Todaro class of models –privilege rural development to 
limit the encroachment of the urban "murky sector"– can usefully complement these policy measures. 
Not only to reduce income inequality, but also to assure that inter-sectoral mobility and urban 
migration are based on actual job opportunities and productivity-based income differences, and not on 
false expectations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper analyzed from an empirical perspective the structural determinants of productivity and 
non-monetary competitiveness in a selection of Asian and Latin America countries. Using sectoral 
growth accounting techniques, it was possible to differentiate and measure the labour productivity 
variations that originated from "productivity proper" and those that were due to the reallocation of 
labour between sectors of activity.  
The empirical analysis is based on data available for nine Asian and nine Latin American 
economies for the period 1985-2001. The results indicate that the traditional source of reallocating 
resources from agriculture to industry is still quite a powerful factor in both regions, albeit in Latin 
America it does not always lead to a favourable outcome as far as total labour productivity is 
concerned.  
The data indicate also a very contrasted situation between both developing regions. While Asian 
real economy appears to be engaged in a relatively smooth transition from the low productivity 
traditional activities to a more industrialized economy, the pattern emerging out of the Latin American 
data indicates a polarizing trend, with a tendency to create a new dualistic economy. 
While industry in Asia was able to close the productivity gap with industrialised countries and 
gain international competitiveness in manufacturing, its firms were also capable of using globalisation 
to expand their market and create more jobs. In Latin America, industries adopted a more defensive 
strategy; industrial investment was meant to preserve competitiveness in the international market by 
improving productivity, but was not meant to increase production capacity, at least on a sectoral scale.  
As a result, the Asian productive sectors were able to offer jobs of increasing quality to their 
economic active population in both goods and services sectors. From a structural perspective, Asia 
followed the predictions of the Lewis model. In Latin America, structural reforms were successful at 
microeconomic level, as firms improved their competitiveness, but less so from a macro perspective 
as few new jobs were created. Because industries did not create new job opportunities in the low to 
middle qualification brackets, Latin America experienced a truncation of its structural transition. The 
relative excess supply of labour was absorbed reactively by the service sector, in a context of 
decreasing value-added per head. Dualism, typical of the initial phases of the Lewis model, 
reappeared with the growth of a large urban informal sector. 
To explain the diverging trajectories, the paper advances that a mixture of real and nominal 
factors may be at work. When Latin America tried to apply the Asian export-led strategy and adopted 
trade liberalization to solve the structural imbalances that caused the 1982 crisis, it faced strong 
competition from a new wave of Asian developing countries with large pools of cheaper labour. In 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Latin American structuralist school has privileged vertically integrated "national champions" to be the 
leading agents behind changes in production patterns and increase in total factor productivity. We argue that 
both strategies are complementary, and not substitute.  
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this competition, Latin America may have also suffered from structurally overvalued exchange rates, 
because it is comparatively richer than Asia in natural resources. The resulting lack of 
competitiveness on labour intensive manufactures squeezed the Latin American manufacture into 
higher productivity types of activity, which increased the demand for higher skills and depressed the 
offer of more traditional industrial jobs.  
The deterioration of the income distribution in Latin America resulted from two trends:  (i) a 
higher demand for high qualification workers, pushing up the salary of professionals and technicians 
(like in Asia), (ii) an excess supply of labour in the services sector leading to a decline in value added 
per worker and lower salaries. The emergence of a large urban informal sector, with the resurgence of 
a new dualism in the labour market, epitomizes this situation. 
Because nominal factors are part of the determinants of the international competitiveness, 
appropriate demand management at the macroeconomic level are therefore needed to avoid real 
exchange rate cycles and provide the domestic firms with a favourable competitive environment. But 
structural issues call for structural remedies, and the rationale behind the Lewis and Harris-Todaro 
models suggests some lines of action. Considering the importance of the labour reallocation 
component in explaining total factor productivity, the structural policies should include actions aimed 
at facilitating resource-shifts from low to high productivity sectors, while promoting rural 
development to limit spurious inter-sectoral shifts. As small and medium firms are the dominant 
employers in most developing countries, they should also be the main beneficiaries of trade 
facilitation policies.  
Finally, the Latin American region should look for export opportunities outside the manufacturing 
sector. Thanks to the IT revolution and the new international business models, its large services sector 
has a potential for developing new export activities, a way that has been successfully taken by India. 
Health and tourism sectors are particularly attractive labour intensive activities, because they create 
jobs across the full range of low to high qualifications.  
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